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Abstract
In the following thesis, an overview of covert channels within Voice over IP is given and then
expanded upon by presenting an experiment which proves the ability to hide messages within
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) of a Voice over IP
packet. The plain text nature of the SIP and SDP packets allow for an easily embedded
message to be encoded into the expected data, while also being “hidden in plain sight” due to
the packet only being sent once per VoIP session. While previous papers [15] have proposed
the ability to hide covert messages within the plain text SIP and SDP packets of a VoIP call
stream, this thesis is the first to carefully analyze and test the ability to embed data in these
packets and send a covert message, based on an agreement between the sending and receiving
parties. Results include the success for covert messages to be hidden within the MaxForwards field, a field used for the total number of hops between sender and receiver, the V
field, a field used for the version of SIP being used, the T field, usually used for the time a
session becomes active on the sending and receiving ends, and finally the O field which
designates the owner the call was originally sent from. This success was met with equal failure
of previously proposed abilities to hide messages [15] in the Branch statement, tag field, and
Call-ID field. A method for systems administrators or network administrators to detect covert
channels coming in over a VoIP enabled network using a simple, modified java based packet
capture tool is then presented with the ability to check the Max-Forwards, V, T and O fields,
due to their low entropy and easy detectability. Using this method, a discussion is given
regarding the detectability of covert channels as compared to previous research papers.
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1. Introduction
In the original thesis written for proposal to embed covert messages into voice over IP, it was
claimed that voice over IP packets have the ability to be modified to include covert messages in
a number of fields throughout the session initiation protocol (SIP) and session description
protocol (SDP) [15]. The plain text nature of the SIP and SDP packets and rarely implemented
encryption for these packets on software based phones, and hardware alike, make them
targets for attackers who possess the knowledge of intercepting, modifying the packets which
contain the initiation and description, and then forwarding the packets onward, almost
instantaneously to ensure that there is little change in the call as compared to a normal call
without modification. It has also been claimed [15] that fields within the SIP and SDP packets
have the ability to be changed without affecting the quality of the call, while still being able to
hold a significant number of characters which will allow for covert message strings to be sent to
a receiving party. On account of no proof or testing found to back up these claims, this thesis
attempts to prove these theoretical claims and then given a systems administrator or network
administrator the ability to easily detect covert channels being sent via their own network,
merely by running a Java based application and reviewing the logs produced.
Within this follow up thesis, results and experimental setup will be explained in addition to an
explanation of the tools developed to detect these covert channels. The basic structure of the
thesis will be as follows: In section 2 it will cover the background of covert channels and the
closely related topic of steganography including steganography throughout history, present day
steganography, covert channels and how they relate to steganography in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3
and 2.4, respectively. In part 3 a discussion of applications to Voice over IP will be given with
8

specifics given about the protocols contained within Voice over IP and how covert messages are
able to be embedded in each. In part 4 the experiment setup will be explained and followed, as
well as the results of the experiment being given in section 5. Further discussion regarding
advantages and disadvantages of this method of covert channels will take place in section 6. In
section 7 an exploration of entropy will be done, followed by section 8 which will explain a Java
based packet sniffing tool, modified to detect and easily present covert channels to a systems
administrator. A brief exploration of tools developed by colleagues at Rochester Institute of
Technology will take place in section 9, followed by ideas for future work and the concluding
paragraph in sections 10 and 11.

2. Background
2. 1 A Brief History of Covert Channels and Steganography
Steganography, or “concealed writing” as roughly translated from Greek [25], is the art of
embedding a message into a textual or graphical piece of work so that the message is
unreadable and virtually unrecognizable to anyone without the knowledge of how to retrieve
and view it. Steganography has a rich past and has been used for ages within the textual and
graphical media areas, and can easily be used within the digital media arena as well. It was the
precursor to digital covert channels and thus can be said to be quite similar.
The history of covert channels date back to before modern methods existed for detecting or
decoding hidden messages within written media. Specifically, creating and decoding hidden
messages was first recorded around 480 BC when the Greeks used covert channels to hide
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messages to inform the Spartans of the plans for an invasion of Xerxes by removing the wax
cover from a wooden table and writing the plans for the invasion on the wood before “covering
the message over with the wax again. In this way the tablets, being apparently blank, would
cause no trouble with the guards along the road….” [11]. This method has also made its way
into pop culture through TV shows reenacting the battles of World War II, showing the allies
passing messages into Italy on the backs of wine bottle labels. Whether this was a true practice
could not be found and therefore could not be documented past this pop culture reference
[24]. One method during the current time period is the sending of a message by a German spy
which, in most other contexts, wouldn’t be seen as a suspicious message. While the message
read:
“Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard
hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on by products, ejecting suets
and vegetable oils.”
A message was actually sent which indicated: “Pershing sails from NY June 1.”, found by taking
the second letter of each word within the original message [11].
A historical example of steganography dates back to the 16th century when Joannes Trithemius
wrote three pieces of literature in Latin, which are said to be the first works which discuss
cryptology and the ability to embed hidden messages in a textual or graphical manner. Upon
further review of these pieces of work, scientists found that the third book contained multiple
steganographical messages including the equivalent of “The quick brown fox jumps over the
lazy dog” as well as “The bearer of this letter is a rogue thief. Guard yourself against him. He
10

wants to do something to you,” both in Latin. Although these messages were meant to be
apparent to the other party to whom Trithemius was sending the message to, it was not
discovered and translated until 1996 by two German Researchers, Dr. Thomas Ernst and Dr. Jim
Reeds. Given that it took so long to find these hidden messages, this example shows the power
of steganography to hide a message in plain sight [12].
Other message types included the use of quilts during the Civil War to guide slaves over a given
path or pass on messages without the ability for slave owners to recognize the patterns and
symbols within the quilt. As seen in Figure 1, one example is the use of the “bear claw” to
indicate to slaves a specific path to follow to their freedom [12]. The crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo
also used various hand positions while being photographed to send the message of “snowjob”
to their allies after being captured [12].

Figure 1: The bear claw quilt to indicate a safe route to slaves [12]

2. 2 Present Day Covert Channels and Steganography
In terms of present use and the justification behind the project described in this thesis, there
has been an ever growing interest in the use of covert channels and steganography after the
events of 9/11/2001. With terrorism being a very real threat and the ability for terrorists to use
11

both technologically simple and complex means to hide messages to be sent to followers, an
interest has been taken in covert channels and steganography, as well as the ability to carry
messages without the knowledge of a middle party [14]. There have been reports of the
possibility of messages being hidden within pornographic websites as well as in eBay auctions
and images, but thus far no suspected images or auctions have been made public [13]. In
addition to these threats, the proposal has been given that there could possibly be hidden
messages in the television or audio broadcasts from Osama Bin Laden [17]. Because covert
channels and steganography are so hard to detect, there have not been any known cases
released to the public, but research is still going on to address these fears.
While most uses of steganography are seen as negative and only used to bypass common
understanding of a specific piece of work, there are also legitimate uses for steganography as
well. The use of one way keys in the forms of SHA1 and MD5 keys has become a prevalent way
for software users to know if the software they are using is the same as the one released by the
software company. Use of steganography in email has become popular in organizations and
even countries which do not allow for the use of encryption on their email. This steganography
can be in the form of line shifting, word shifting, or hiding messages within different parts of
the message, as can be seen in Figure 2 which is a note sent from California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger to members of the California State Assembly (note the first letter of each line).
Watermarking on images and audio files allow for the true ownership to be determined and
kept while the image or audio file is exchanged on the Internet as seen in Figure 3 [2].
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Figure
2: Note
from
Arnold
Schwar
zenegg
er to
Californ
ia State
Assemb
ly
Figure 3: Photographical watermark example [23]
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2. 3 What is a covert channel?
While VoIP communication is a new concept, the idea of covert channels is far from new. The
idea of covert channels, or hiding a piece of information inside of a communication medium
which allows for a bypass of security measures on that communications medium [26] was
proposed over 30 years ago. This specific phrasing and usage was first proposed in 1973 in an
ACM paper by Butler Lampson. Until this point is was a relatively new idea which no one
believed could be implemented in an electronic format. The Department of Defense eventually
picked up this idea in 1985; once more research was done [26]. The formal definition and types
of covert channels varies greatly between sources. For the sake of this thesis, a covert channel
will be defined as: “The ability for a communication to be sent over a communication medium
which was either not designed to send alternate communications over, or that allows for the
bypass of system security policies within the process” [26]. Because of the amount of research
into covert channels by multiple parties with multiple ideas into what they are, a truly formal
definition is yet to be established. Thus, the thesis will use the preceding definition and will
furthermore define three types of covert channels that can be used within VoIP.
The authors of [26] discuss a number of different types of covert channels, to which this section
applies and attempts to explain for the sake of enumerating the relevant types of covert
channels. Covert channels have the ability to exist in both a user based model or within a kernel
based model. In other words, a covert channel has the ability to run with different types of
permission, thus giving it different types of access to the resources of its host and destination
machine. As the average user has the ability to write to a “profile” on a source and destination
machine, and can only write to the software which supports the machine and its operations, it
14

is said that the user will generally have a user space covert channel ability. Simply put, this
means that a covert channel may be able to be spread through one of the mediums this thesis
will cover in subsequent paragraphs, and be able to signal a second party by modifying,
creating, writing to or broadcasting through a piece of software or file. This can be the writing
to a file on the destination machine, the modification of a protocol as viewed through a piece of
software, attempting to access the destination machine on a given port or with a certain
protocol, or signaling the second party with a covert message while using a third party
application such as a MMORPG game. The second basic type of existence that a covert channel
has is in a kernel based model which requires the covert channel to be able to interface with
the machine itself, fully bypassing the operating system altogether, but also requiring a very
high permission which is generally hard to do. To send a covert channel within kernel mode
requires the user to become an authority over the hardware itself, thus being able to leave
messages within unused sections of system memory (RAM), modifying processes being run
within the central processing unit (CPU) to send a signal, or even modifying properties of the
video which the user sees by sending signals through the video card. While there are programs
that are available to change some of these values, they are mainly used for system utilities and
generally are not used except for locally on a machine and in cases where a recovery or other
such utility is needed because of the dangers they introduce to the system. While there are two
different types of existences that covert channels can manifest themselves as, there are also
three different types of covert channels which can be used to send a message to the user on a
destination computer. The first is commonly known as a storage channel, or value based spatial
channel as phrased by the authors of [26], utilizes the idea of modifying packets or the area
15

which packets are stored within the destination machine [14]. These modifications usually
consist of writing to the packets and embedding information to a header or footer of sorts, thus
to be only received by the receiving party who is aware that there is information hidden within
the packet. For example, when sending a packet over a medium through which a covert
channel is being utilized, a packet may be of a certain length or may have a certain embedded
header with 32 bits of data. If either one of these qualities is true that packet may represent the
letter F in the schema of a mod 26 alphabet algorithm. An alternate use of covert channels is
using a timing channel or value based temporal channel as phrased by the authors of [26]. This
timing channel is true to its name in that it modifies the timing properties of packets and when
they are sent or at what point they are sent in regards to their comparison in frequency [14].
For example, a packet sent with a time stamp ending in 1 may represent the letter A while
another ending in 5 may represent E. This can also be applied to the frequency, in which the
destination times how many packets it receives within a given amount of time and bases
lettering algorithms on such. So, if 5 packets are received within a time period of 2 seconds,
they may represent E, similar to the previous example. A third type of covert channel has gone
unmentioned in most of the sources from which this research section was based. The authors
of [26] propose a new type of covert channel which utilizes the transitions between events and
how events, whether it is storage channels or timing channels, interact with each other at the
destination. For instance, the example of modifying the port to which a protocol is sent is used
within [26] where if a packet is sent to port 1234, and once received a second one is sent to
port 6464, the destination may know that this is representative of the letter A. As with the rest
of the types of covert channels covered previously, the continuation of sending packets will
16

spell out a message based on the transitions between events as they occur. This was alluded to
in [14], in which the authors discuss hybrid covert channels. While hybrid covert channels
represent the ability for both a storage and timing channel to interact with the same
destination at once, a transitional channel does not necessarily allow for the covert message to
be stored or to modify an already existing file, but rather only keeps track of the events which
occur.

2. 4 Covert Channels versus Steganography
Within the majority of the papers written on covert channels, there seems to be the ability and
practice to interchange the phrases “covert channel” and “steganography.” While this thesis
does not propose they are not very similar, and one may be a part of another, it does propose
the two be separated and used in different contexts. As given in the definition earlier of a
covert channel, a covert channel is “The ability for a communication to be sent over a
communication medium which was either not designed to send alternate communications
over, or that allows for the bypass of system security policies within the process [26].” On the
contrary, this thesis proposes that steganography is: “The process through which a message is
hidden within a static medium, which is unable or has a large amount of difficulty to be
changed and can only be seen by a readily prepared party.” As discussed previously, this is not
to say that covert channels and steganography are not similar in nature. This thesis proposes
that a covert channel is within the realm of steganography in itself, but not the other way
around. This is based on the conclusion that a covert channel must be contained within a
transport medium rather than within a static medium and therefore would be in transport.
Thus the covert channel would acquire a fleeting property in that if not captured, it cannot be
17

proven the covert channel ever existed. On the other hand, a steganographical message will
always exist unless completely destroyed, and is readily viewable and analyzable by any viewing
party.
The example of a drawing can be used when discussing steganography. A drawing may have a
hidden message within it, codes or symbols embedded within it or a 3 dimensional image
available to be seen by only those parties who have the knowledge in how to look at the image
in a certain way or from a certain angle. While this can definitely be considered a
steganographical image, the permanent nature of the image and the everlasting message
contained within it do not make it a covert channel because of a covert channel’s fleeting
properties and need to be captured to become steganography. In the example of the drawing, a
message was hidden within the drawing, a medium which generally is not used to send
messages in such a readily available form, and is relatively permanent. On the other hand, if a
timing channel is sent to a destination machine and the packets are not analyzed as to the
number which comes in every second, there is really no evidence which can be tracked at a
later date as to what happened within this situation. The destination may have readily available
the means to distinguish the message, but the message is not hidden within a static medium,
but rather a dynamic one which is constantly changing, if only in the way that there is the
change in which packets are being sent. There is also the ability to easily change the packets, in
contrast to a drawing which is static and can only be changed by overwriting data, rather than
modifying it as proposed here.

18

3. Applications to Voice over IP
The biggest advantage to Voice over IP and the reason why it has become so popular is because
of its real time transfer ability of both voice and data streams. This can be seen in the average
VoIP call or video instant messaging applications, which have become more popular as
promises of “free long distance calling” have been promoted. The inner workings of Voice over
IP are split into two different phases, one being the “signaling phase” and the other being the
“conversation phase.” Within the experimental section the signaling phase will be addressed as
part of the experiments, [but both phases are explained with] SIP and SDP being part of the
signaling phase and RTP being part of the conversation phase [16].

3. 1 SIP
The SIP packet is the basic mechanism by which the sending party informs the receiving party
that they would like to connect and exchange data. As soon as the number for the receiving
party is dialed and recognized, the PBX server, or proxy through which the VoIP phone is
allowed access to the Internet and then continues on to the receiving party, sends a SIP
message to the receiving end to invite them to take part in the call. This SIP packet contains the
basic information that is needed to communicate, similar to most other communication
mediums, including the protocol being used in the SIP, maximum number of hops between
source and destination, identification of the sender and receiver and the type of data that is
contained within the transfer. Once the receiving end acknowledges that they will take place in
the call, i.e., the handset of the receiver is picked up, the receiving end sends a session
description packet as it needs to inform the sending client which abilities it has and what it
understands to be the agreed upon medium and encryption [16]. A SIP packet is also sent at
19

the end of the session to inform the receiving end that it is disconnecting, therefore ending the
session.

Figure 4: The VoIP call setup and breakdown [16]

Figure 5: The SIP “BYE” message is sent when the call disconnects

20

Figure 6: SIP and SDP color coded within a SIP packet for clarity [16]
Within the following section, Figure 6 will play a large role and be referred to often. In Figure 6,
it can be seen that there is an entire SIP packet which will be sent on initiation of the VoIP
session. The packet itself is color coded by the authors of [16] for clarity, with the top section
(lines 1 through 10) being in gray representing the session initiation protocol as opposed to the
session description protocol (lines 11 through 18) being in white at the bottom of the image.
Both of these are contained within the SIP packet that is sent to the destination party when the
call is initiated, which allows for the opposite party to begin to process and receive the
information that the source is trying to do so with. As can be seen while analyzing the SIP
packet, there are a number of different details sent from the source to the destination when
the call is initiated. Within the initiation packet, the source sends an invite to join the call to the
destination, consisting of the address from which the call came from, the source, destination,
maximum number of forwards for the call to take, the identification number, contact, and type
of call that is being initiated (voice as opposed to data). As can be seen in Figure 6, there are a
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number of fields bolded, which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. A similar practice is
done in the SDP, which is contained within lines 11 through 18 and has a white background.
The SIP, in general, supports five characteristics of a call including the location, availability,
capabilities, session setup and session management, as documented within Request for
Comments 3261 [22]. While the first two characteristics, location and availability are relatively
self explanatory, the additional three may require some additional explanation. A user’s
capability is determined based on what media they are attempting to connect to the session
through, and the parameters of the media and device they are using to connect. The session
setup is the part of the call in which there is a “ringing” [22] and a party is invited to join the
session. The client is also informed of the capabilities so that an agreement between the
sending and receiving parties can be made. This may be used to invite additional parties into a
conference type call, with an additional SIP packet being sent to the desired invitees. While not
all of the fields are necessary and the bulk of them are ignored by the SIP completely, they are
included in the SIP packet to ensure uniformity across VoIP sessions.
As can be seen in Figure 6, a number of fields are bolded, the bold text representing fields
which have the ability to be changed, either because they are ignored by the SIP altogether, or
the information that they provide does not lend anything to the call other than a formality.
While the fields do have to exist, because of their criticality to establishing the call itself, they
theoretically can be changed in a number of different ways to be potential covert channels. As
can be seen on the second line of the session initiation protocol, the branch statement is used
to form an identification for the transaction that will occur within the call [16]. While in [16] it is
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seen that the branch statement does have to begin with “z9hG4bK,” the other 5 digits can be
modified to send a covert message, without fear of having the call dropped or the message
detected. This lends itself to the ability to send a covert message using the SIP, but there are
also a number of other fields which allow for a similar practice. Fields such as Max-Forwards,
tag (within the source address), call ID (before the domain name), cseq (the sequence in which
the call was originally sent, for identification purposes), and contact (before the actual contact
name and domain) can theoretically be changed to allow for covert messages to be sent. This is
because none of them are necessarily required for the voice call to successfully take place, but
rather are for convenience once the packet reaches the destination [16].

3. 2 SDP
The SDP packet is sent after the SIP packet has been accepted at the receiving end to inform
the sending party what protocols can be used within the VoIP call, as well as at intervals
throughout the call to ensure that media attributes have not changed. While this interval is not
specified in the RFC [8], it can be observed as being sent midway through the call (8 seconds
into a 13 second call) in Figure 5. This packet is sent from the receiving end with details such as
the media attributes which the two clients are connected by, the owner and session ID, the
time which the call and conference calls become active and the name of session, usually
populated by the name of the soft phone client. Within the SDP, a number of variables are
used, including v, o, s, t, and k. These all represent needed values within the SDP which are also
available to be changed and include covert messages. The variables stand for:
V - Version, a field usually ignored by the session initiation protocol
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O - The owner from which the message originated made up of random numbers
S - Session name, also ignored by the SIP and SDP
T - Time session active, ignored by the SIP and SDP
K - Potential encryption that is used within the SIP and SDP
Within these fields, each variable has caveats which allow for them to be changed or added to,
which is the reason why they are unneeded and can be changed. The “v” or version field is the
version of the Session Description Protocol being used within the current call. All version
numbers are whole numbers with no “minor version numbers” [8]. Because of the
communication of version number, so long as the version number specified is accepted at the
receiving end of the VoIP call, the version can be changed to convey a message, assuming both
parties establish a way not to convey accidental messages with automatically populated version
numbers. The origin field, or “o” variable, is seen on line 12 of Figure 6, and has three sections
of its field highlighted in bold. The origin is made up of the user name of the sending party,
along with a session id and session version number. The session id, as of the writing of [8], has
no uniform implementation, but rather has suggested ways that the equipment processing the
VoIP call can use, specifically the suggestion of using a Network Time Protocol (NTP) as the
session id to allow for calls to be more accurate based on the time sent and received. The
version number is similar to the session id, in that it is randomly assigned, and is only used to
establish which message has been sent most recently, especially when looking into proxy
announcements. This allows for the receiving party to determine which messages are most
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recent, and is therefore also recommended to utilize an NTP timestamp, for the same reasons
as the session ID.
The session description protocol is actually quite similar to the SIP in terms of the fields within
both. In the first field (line 11 of Figure 6) the version of the SDP protocol being used is
displayed but ignored by the destination, other than to establish which version of the SDP is
being used and therefore how it will be processed on the receiving end. Therefore, so long as
the field is changed to a currently used and accepted version by the receiving party, and a
version check is actually done by the receiving party, this version number can be changed to
include some sort of single digit covert channel.
Similar to the version number, the owner is made up of a string field and two random
identification numbers following it. As with the version number, these owner fields should exist
within the SDP packet, but do not necessarily have to be whatever the system assigns to the
original. While the end of this field will identify the domain from which the call originated, the
owner and two identification numbers can be changed to send a covert message. The session
name (variable s) and time the session is activated (variable t) will have a similar quality, while
using t to send a covert message may border on being a time based covert channel, with the
others being storage based, based on their existence within the protocol when sent. Both of
these fields are theoretically able to be modified to send covert channels, mainly because they
are made up of assigned strings of characters, or a random string of numbers, respectively [8].
A field which does not exist in Figure 6, but is claimed to be available by the RFC is “i” which is
the session description. This description is user defined and can be a string of characters input
25

by the user, and therefore would be an obvious place to look for covert channels if analyzing
the packet. A special case to be analyzed is k. K is the encryption protocol used while sending
the SDP, a field which is mostly unused, but can be used when the need for encryption of VoIP
call itself arises. Within Figure 6, line 16 shows the k variable as it would naturally be without
encryption, stating, as its first string, ”clear” meaning there is no encryption being
implemented. While there are very few sources that clearly explain how the encryption or
decryption is done when implementing it over a covert channel, the assumption of the author is
that both parties can either verify that the key is the same on both ends of the call, to ensure
that the message was not intercepted, or the encryption key can be used for some type of
software that is implemented to encrypt and decrypt the call for the source and destination,
respectively. The key may also be entered by the receiving party, as briefly covered in [8].

3. 3 RTP
In addition to SDP and SIP, there is also the ability for real time transfer protocol, or RTP, to be
used within the realm of covert channels as well. Because of the nature of RTP and the need for
a codec to be used within it to compress and decompress the voice of the sender/receiver,
there are actually two different ways to embed a covert channel within the protocol itself. The
first is demonstrated briefly in Figure 7 [26], but still requires a bit of explanation. When the call
is established between the source and destination, the invite has been accepted and the
process to condition the line to allow for voice transmission begins. This conditioning consists of
allowing for the sender to speak into the VoIP device that is available on their end and have
their voice compressed into a digital signal. When the signal is compressed using a codec, it is
encoded into a stream of bits and then has the ability to be blended with another audio source
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if so chosen. The authors of [26] choose to do exactly this, and blend the voice stream as
captured from the VoIP device with another digital audio track. In this way, when the two
parties are having a conversation, there is another voice track, in the case of [26] a music track,
but this can also be another voice, which is playing. This secondary track would be what a third
party would hear if they tried to tap the line.

Figure 7: Blending of the original audio signal and another audio signal to embed a privacy
covert channel
The second ability for use of RTP covert messages is the use of modified fields, similar to SIP
and SDP. As can be seen in Figure 8 [16], a number of fields are labeled optional or
recommended and allow for the modification of them to allow for a cover channel to be
embedded within the packet itself. The advantage to using this over the blended audio stream
is the ability for multiple messages to be sent, one within each packet that is sent out
throughout the VoIP session. Because of the nature of the VoIP session, multiple packets are
sent out throughout the VoIP call, which allows for a new message to be sent out each time an
RTP packet is sent.
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When it comes to the actual fields that can be used, there are four main parts of the protocol
that can be utilized. The padding field is the first which can be utilized, mainly because it is used
for encryption algorithms when implemented. If the encryption algorithm is not implemented,
the padding field will be set to 0 and a length of the padding field can be set as the last octet of
the padding itself. This octet will tell the destination how many fields to ignore when the data is
received, including itself. This is also the situation with the extended header, which is set in
field 3 of the first line, similar to the padding field being set to true or false. Similar to SIP, the
RTP packet contains the ability to modify the sequence field, a relatively random field which
specifies the order in which the packet was sent. In addition, the time field can also be used,
but must be used on the first packet because this will establish what the value of the field in
subsequent packets will contain. Interestingly, the timestamp field can also be used in a second
way to send covert messages. The value of the timestamp field determines when the packet
left the source and will be analyzed by the destination when it arrives.
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Figure 8: Illustration of the possibility to modify the RTP protocol to send a covert message
The authors of [14] propose that if a packet is sent from the source to the destination but is
somehow delayed in transit, or the time field modified to represent a type of delay in transit,
the packet will still make its way to the destination, but will be dropped and not processed in
the VoIP session itself. While this has to be done with great care because of the limited
threshold of error that a VoIP stream can handle, there is still the possibility to change the
timestamp field resulting in a covert message being able to be hidden inside. Within the
timestamp field there is also a least significant bit which can be modified to send covert
messages as well.
In addition to being able to modify the timestamp while using RTP, there is also the ability to
modify the stream itself and embed datagrams into the stream instead of actual voice. This,
again, has to be used with great care, because of the error threshold that each codec, which
will be sending and receiving the voice data, has. For example, the voice codec G723.1 has a 1
percent error capability. This may cause problems because of such a small error rate, as
compared to G729A which allows for up to a 3 percent error rate. While neither is ideal for
sending an excessively large message to recipients, they both add an additional possibility of
covert channels [14].

4. Experimental Setup
While much research was done to explain the types of covert messages and locations where
covert messages could be hidden, there was no evidence that was found to demonstrate that
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these experiments were actually carried out. For this thesis, these experiments were carried
out within a virtual environment with three virtual machines, one acting as a server and the
other two as clients. For the virtual clients, VMWare Workstation 6.5.1 was utilized under an
academic license registered to Rochester Institute of Technology. Each client consisted of a
Windows XP SP3 operating system, each running with 512MB of RAM AND 64 GB Maximum
capacity for their hard drives. Both clients were licensed under the Microsoft Academic Alliance
Licensing. For the phones used in this experiment, the decision was made to use software
phones to keep the cost to a minimum and to ensure that the SIP protocol was actually used,
rather than proprietary protocols used commonly with hardware based phones such as
Polycom [20]. With this in mind, X-Lite version 3.0 build 29712 was used on both clients, which
used the SIP protocol and also added an extra field to the SDP which will turn out to be
beneficial later in the experiment.
For the server, Windows 2008 64 bit edition was used and licensed under Microsoft Academic
Alliance Licensing, and was given 1024 MB of RAM and 64GB of maximum hard drive space. The
server ran its own PBX, 3CX PBX specifically, which allows for a free server to be installed on any
server, interface with an outside voice over IP provider and be managed by a user with little or
no experience [1]. It is web console based and allows for individual phones to be added and
assigned unique identities, extensions and properties. When connected, clients are registered
into the 3CX system and are passed these identities.
As can be seen in Figure 6 and proposed in the original experiment, the authors of [6] proposed
that within the SIP and SDP there are a number of fields that can be changed to embed covert

30

messages. In Figure 6, each field that is bolded was proposed to be able to carry a covert
message, without affecting the outcome of the call or the connection that is made between the
sender and the receiver. In the following sections, each one of these fields will be examined
with the outcome that was produced when the experiment was carried out.
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5. Results

Figure 9: A clean SIP/SDP packet as captured by Winsock Packet Editor
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5. 1 The branch statement
The first experiment that was run was on the first field noted in [6], or the branch statement.
The branch statement is claimed to have to begin with a standardized phrase of “z9hG4bK” but
has five characters after which it can be modified according to the authors, rather than the 29
found while carrying out the experiment. In the experimental setup, Wireshark was used in
conjunction to Winsock Packet Editor to view the packets and record the results as the packets
were edited. While using Winsock Packet Editor, it was found that there is the ability to
successfully modify the last five characters of the branch statement by inputting the hex values
of the required standardized branch statement and appending a message to them, also in hex
format. In this case, z9hG4bK translates into 7A 39 68 47 34 62 4B which was the searched for
string when inputting it into WPE.

33

Figure 10: The Hex translation of the “z9hG4bK” Key in the Branch statement
The result of the modification of the branch statement was a successfully connected call for the
receiver, but the client not being able to recognize that the call was connected and therefore
timing out and dropping the call. According to packet capturing tools, as can be seen in Figure
11, the sender believes that because it was unable to receive a properly formed SIP/SDP packet
back from the receiver that the session is not connected and in fact, does not exist. Notice in
the Status-Line the message “SIP/2.0481 Call/Transaction Does Not Exist.”
Interestingly, the branch statement is much longer in experiments than originally proposed in
[6]. Even with additional experiments run to test the first five characters after the phrase of
“z9hG4bK,” the call continues to fail, thus disproving this field is able to carry a covert channel.
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Figure 11: Example of a failed call as illustrated through a Wireshark capture of
“Call/Transaction does not exist”

5. 2 Max-Forwards
The Max-Forwards line is usually set to a value of 70, indicating the number of times that the
VoIP packet should be forwarded between routers while on its route to the
destination/receiver. This value is small and may not be enough to send an overly complex
covert message, but with the agreement between sender and receiver that the value should be
70 unless there is a covert message embedded in it, this could at least be an indicator that a
covert message is embedded in the actual packet.
As can be seen in Figure 12, WPE was set up to filter and change the value of Max-Forwards,
based on its hex value and change it up to ten times within any packets sent or received. In
Figures 12 and 13, we can see that the packet was successfully changed and resulted in a
completed call between the sender and receiver.
While there are drawbacks to using this field for embedding covert messages, namely that
there are only two characters that can be used to send either a signal or message, as well as a
non-standardized value to be placed in this field, this method of sending covert messages does
work and allows for calls to be established and maintained. With careful planning and careful
observation by both the sender and receiver, this could hide simple messages which could have
dire effects.
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Figure 12: Change of Max-Forwards using the hex input feature of Winsock Packet Editor
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Figure 13: A successful call as seen by both the sending and receiving clients
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Figure 14: Illustration of Max-Forwards changed to 95

5. 3 The tag Field
Similar to the previous fields, Max-Forwards and Branch, the tag field also had the problem of
allowing for the call to connect to the other side, but not being recognized on the sender’s side
as being connected. This is thought to be because of a malformed packet when an
acknowledgement is received from the receiving side at the sender side. In tests that were run
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on the tag field, similar results were returned as in the error found while testing the branch
statement, in which “Transaction does not exist,” was returned.

5. 4 Call-ID Field
The Call-ID field was tested multiple times with multiple values due to a number of different
examples and theories by both source authors and this experiment’s author. The Call-ID field in
[6] was full of only numbers and thus was tested as such in the first experiment. This resulted in
a similar result as the previous fields in which the call went through as seen by the receiver, but
an error of “Transaction does not exist” was returned to the sender (in packet form).
In contrast to what was seen in [6], during the experiment it was observed that the Call-ID field
was actually made up of numerous alphanumeric characters, as can be seen in the image
below.
Therefore, the Call-ID was tested a second time with multiple alphanumeric characters,
specifically the phrase “dropthebomb” embedded into the message. With the observation of
this also not working, the idea that the first character of the line might also need to remain the
same, or at least that of a hex character, as it was in each of the tests. Therefore, an additional
test of allowing the first character to remain unchanged, but subsequent characters modified
was performed, but also failed. With this change, the Call-ID field read “Edropthebomb” and
still failed to connect. Finally, the theory that characters within the Call-ID field must be hex
based characters (1..9, a…f) was experimented with, but again resulted in the same conclusion.
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5. 5 CSeq
In the testing environment, a discrepancy was seen as compared to [6] in that the CSeq variable
was only one numeric character, rather than 5 as proposed in the original source. This is
proposed to be because of the very limited number of clients that were involved in the
experiment, and the very small number of calls that were made on either client in the
experiment. The CSeq number, according to the [8], is incremented based on the number of
dialogs per session. Therefore, while this was tested and successfully proved to be a viable
candidate for embedded covert channels, rather than multiple numerical characters being able
to be embedded into the stream (5 in the example of [6]), it was only a single character. While
this may be limiting in the types of covert messages that could be embedded, there would be
the ability to at least signal the receiver of the presence of a covert channel.

5. 6 From
From seemed to be one of the most useful fields in the experiment because of its valid ability to
be changed and have covert messages embedded in it, as well as how it works when picked up
by the receiving client. The From field is in essence the caller id field that would be seen in the
average telephone call, and indicates to the receiver who is calling through the display of the
softphone as seen in Figure 15. As can be seen, the caller ID field was changed to
“Sdropbomb2” from “Softphone2” while keeping the contact information such as email and
response address the same, and therefore allowed for an immediate covert message to be
popped up on the screen. This call was able to complete successfully, as evidenced in the
graphic below, and would therefore be a viable candidate for covert messages. While there is
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the ability for this field to be changed, the caveat that any onlookers can easily see a covert
channel on receipt should be carefully evaluated before using this field.

Figure 15: Change in the From field (similar to the Caller-ID)
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Figure 16: Change in the From field as seen by the Winsock Packet Editor

5. 7 SDP V field
THE V field as found in the SIP is usually the version of the SIP protocol being used, to ensure
compatibility between different processing systems, i.e., different VoIP phones. This field is
generally ignored now that [8] containing information about SIP has been officially accepted
and thus was theorized as able to be changed with no adverse effects on the call itself. Through
experimentation and editing the V field as based on a “v=” keyword, it was found that the SDP
V field was successfully changed to 4 rather than 0 with no effect on the call whatsoever.
Although this was done using the client on either side of the VoIP exchange, there should be no
adverse effects on the call even using a different receiving software client due to evidence that
this field is ignored during the initiation.

5. 8 SDP O field
The O field is used to identify the owner from which a message originated and is formatted in a
<user><number><number> format. It seemed while conducting the experiment that these
fields were made up of id numbers or time stamps and therefore when they were changed,
caused the call to fail. In the original source [6], the authors proposed that this field should be
ignored by the receiving client, but when these numbers were changed to different numbers,
the call connected on the receiving client’s end and failed on the sending client’s end, reporting
back a “transaction does not exist” error, similar to previously tested fields.
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5. 9 SDP S field
The S field is the field of the SIP which gives a session name to the VoIP transfer. Unlike other
fields such as the tag or Call-ID field, the S field is ignored and only used when the client is able
to read the plain text session name and display it. In the experiment, the S field was ignored
and therefore successfully modified with no affect on the call whatsoever. The session name
was changed to the common “dropthebomb” phrase that was used throughout the
experiments to ensure the conformity with a standard alpha based phrase.

5. 10 SDP T field
Similar to the CSeq field, the T field is used to determine the time that the session became
active, both on the sending and receiving ends. Therefore, there are two numerical fields that
are used for information with a space between them. According to [6] these fields are supposed
to be ignored and therefore not affect the call if changed. When changing the T fields, the call
completed successfully with the standard values of “0 0” being changed to “8 9”. The call
connected on both ends and the covert channel was sent without interfering with the call.
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Figure 17: Change in the T field from “0 0” to “8 9”

5. 11SDP K field
While carrying out the experiment, it seemed odd that a K field was not found while monitoring
the packets, either while monitoring them with WPE or with Wireshark. When more research
was done into this area it was found that the K field may only exist in the SIP’s of clients which
support an encrypted call to be made. With free software based phones, this was not possible
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and thus there was no K field to modify. A future version of this experiment could be done to
try to demonstrate the abilities to hide covert channels within encrypted Voice over IP calls, but
is currently cost prohibitive and outside the scope of this overall experiment.

6. Further Discussion
Unlike the RTP transport protocol that is used to carry the actual voice data to the receiving end
during the VoIP session, and which also has the ability to carry covert messages within it [5] the
SIP and SDP have the advantage of requiring an acknowledgement message to be sent before
they will allow for voice data to be sent. While the covert channel that is being sent within the
SIP and SDP has to be small because of the limited amount of room within the packet, there is
the advantage that the sender will know that the receiver has received the covert message
because of the acknowledgement that is returned once the SIP and SDP packets have been
received and accepted. Interestingly, this goes against the basic properties of User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), which is what VoIP is said to communicate over. UDP’s property of making a
“best effort” attempt to send the message to the receiving party would usually make for a poor
communication medium/protocol to send covert messages over. In contrast, SIP and SDP use
the acknowledgement system which makes them a great message carrier.
Another advantage that this method has as compared to other covert channels, including those
used in RTP, is that the covert message being sent has to be detected at the very beginning of
the call. If a packet capture were to begin after the phone has rung and been picked up, the SIP
and SDP packets will have already been sent and there is only a very small likelihood that
additional messages will be contained in the maintenance SDP packets. This also lends itself to
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the advantage of RTP packets being seen as UDP packets if the control packet, or RTCP packet,
is not seen at the beginning of the call. Therefore, they would be indistinguishable from any
other average UDP packet being sent across the network.
With these advantages, though, come disadvantages as well. As was seen in the experiments, if
the acknowledgement packet is not sent, usually because the SIP or SDP packet is malformed,
the call cannot complete and no data is able to be sent. While this does not impact the result
of being able to send a covert message across the line in the SIP or SDP packet, it does cause a
bit of suspicion if observed by a systems administrator. Given the wealth of knowledge
available regarding covert messages and this thesis, a systems administrator could continuously
monitor that extension or soft phone for variances from the packet norm.
This leads to another disadvantage: currently to detect a covert channel within the SIP and SDP
packets, a systems administrator would have to run a packet capture utility on the VoIP device
and continuously monitor until a covert message is sent. Because the call may not come at a
specific time or interval, this could be extremely time consuming both in capturing and the
effort to monitor VoIP logs.
This thesis also does not account for the ability for a single message to be carried within SIP or
SDP packets over multiple calls, or in terms of cover channels “an event based channel over
time.” While the tool provided in the following sections does account for any SIP or SDP packet
which may have changed values, it is up to human logic to detect the full string through which
the message is sent. This could include piecing together the values of Max-Forwards, or any
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other SIP or SDP field for that matter, which presents a danger solely based on the time and
effort needed to do so.

Figure 18: Illustration of VoIP being seen as UDP within Wireshark

7. Entropy
In any communication medium in which there is a message being sent, especially between
multiple carriers, we have to worry about entropy. Entropy, put simply, is the uncertainty that
the message that is received on the receiving end, is different than that sent from the sending
end of the medium. In the realm of probability, entropy is the idea that there is a certain
variable which the experimenter is oblivious to, and thus there is a possibility of multiple results
occurring the more times the experiment is repeated. Take for example the simple game of a
coin being flipped. If we assume the coin is fair and both sides are weighted the same as to
produce an equal probability of landing upward, we can confidently say there is a 1 in 2 (1/2)
probability that either side will face upward on the coin’s landing. However, if we do not have
the confidence that a coin is fair and both sides are weighted evenly, another variable is added
into the equation. This variable is actually two fold in which we now have a probability of each
side landing, thus probability p for heads and q of tails [6].
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In the first example in which both sides had an equal chance of facing upward when the coin
lands, we say that the coin has an entropy of 1. There is the possibility of either side facing
upward because the coin is even and the outcome of either side facing upward is only left up to
chance. In the second example of the coin in which there are two probabilities, different
possibilities for either side to face upward when the coin lands, we can confidently say that
there is an entropy of less than 1, but an exact value is impossible to come up with without the
exact probabilities. In a final case that could be made in which the coin does not have a tails
side, but rather is double-headed, we can confidently say that the coin has an entropy value of
zero because there is only a single possibility and thus no unknown variable of chance which
can be factored into the coin toss.
Entropy was originally proposed by Claude E. Shannon in his paper “A Mathematical Theory of
Communication,” published in 1948 [6]. This paper was based on the work of Lazare Carnot,
who originally coined the concept of entropy as it applied to the concept of energy in a working
system, in which a certain amount of energy is lost during work in the form of heat [9]. This
concept can easily be seen in the example of friction, especially for anyone who has used a
grinding wheel to grind metal or sharpen a blade. When the grinding wheel first starts running,
it is cold and wastes very little energy while running on its own. When the wheel comes in
contact with the piece of metal, wasteful energy can be seen visually in the way of sparks
coming off of the metal and through touch due to the heat that is dissipated into both the
wheel and the blade itself.
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Another more relevant example of entropy in the communications field is the childhood game
known as “telephone.” In the game, a number of people line up and a message is verbally given
to the first member of the line in a way that will not allow for the rest of the members to hear.
This person is given the task to pass this message to the next person in line in the same manner,
but cannot repeat the message once it has been given. At the final person (n-1), the message is
repeated out loud and an evaluation of the difference between the original message and the
one which is received is done. This example is quite similar to the idea of embedding a covert
channel, because is it very similar to the process through which voice over IP works. For each
member that the message has to travel through in the telephone line, there is a higher
probability that the message will not be the exact same one as the message which originally
entered the telephone system. Therefore, there is also the ability that each member may
embed unneeded data into the message, which may not even be recognizable to the other
members, and thus send a covert message either to a member later on in the telephone chain,
or just send a false message to the final member of the telephone chain. For each member
through which the message has to pass, there is a 50% chance that the exact message
understood by them will be that which their sender sent, and thus for each new person that is
added to the chain, the probability that the message will continue to be correct at the final
receiver is 1/2n-1. This is exactly the problem with voice over IP and why they are so susceptible
to embedded covert messages.
Within each field of the voice over IP communication, there is the ability to compare entropy by
viewing the sent message to the acknowledgement message that is received by the second
party. This limits the ability for a covert channel to exist undetected once it leaves the sending
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party (as would be the case in a man in the middle attack), but when it comes to covert
channels purposely sent by the sender, there is the need for analysis of the field as compared
to what it should be as based on default settings or common settings which have either no
ability or rare ability to be changed on the SIP server itself. In the following paragraphs, it will
be attempted to evaluate the amount of entropy in each field that was found to be able to be
changed within the original experiment. Because of the needed equations, which will be given
in the following paragraphs, entropy will not always be a value between zero and one, and it
will be assumed that there are only two parties involved in the call as to not introduce
uncertain variables from multiple other parties.

7.1 Branch
The Branch field is a unique identifier that is used by both the sender and the receiver in the
form of the Via statement. When a request is made for a client to join a call, in the way of an
INVITE packet being sent, both clients will use the same assigned Branch statement throughout
the call. The Branch statement must be unique in both the way of the current call and all past
and future calls, and must begin with the characters “z9hG4bK” in that order and case sensitive.
Interestingly, there is no specific standard for the number of characters that make up the
Branch statement, but for the sake of consistency, this thesis will use an assumed 42 characters
to make up the Branch statement [22]. Because of the needed structure of the first 7
characters, they can be excluded from the entropy calculation, as well as the needed 6 hyphens
able to be excluded. With the assumption that 26 English alphabet characters can be used in
either uppercase or lower case and 10 standard numbers, for each applicable character within
the 29 character string, there are a total of 62 possibilities. Therefore, the calculation of
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entropy for the branch statement will be log26229=172.6717, as rounded to four places after the
decimal point.

7.2 Max-Forwards
The Max-Forwards field is a standard field in all SIP sends in which the sending end of the call
sets a type of time to live (TTL) for the packet which, if reached, will indicate the packet as not
received and the receiver not available within the given specifications. The Max-Forwards field
is usually set to 70 as it has been found to be the standard and unchangeable within the 3CX
test bed system. Therefore, as the variables given here are constant, we can very easily detect
the possibility of a covert message by comparing the current Max-Forwards value to the
standard value of 70. In the experimental section, it can be seen in the screen shot that MaxForwards was changed to 95, indicating a possible message being sent to the second party.
While this may impact the call itself, especially if this number is set to a value less the 70, we
can still conclude that there is a definite indicator of a covert message being embedded in the
call. To calculate the entropy, we assume that the Max-Forwards variable will stay at two
digits, as found to be the case in both this experiment and the original case [16]. Therefore
with the two digits having ten possibilities each we can calculate the entropy to be as follows:
log2102 = 6.6439, as rounded to four places after the decimal point.

7.3

Tag

The tag field of the SIP is generally used as an identifier for both the sender and the receiver. It
is unique to each client within the VoIP network and is randomized “with at least 32 bits of
randomness” [22]. Within a given VoIP call, the tag field will be different in the “From” field
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(receiver side) and the “To” field, a property which would hold even if the call was sent in the
opposite direction. In other words, if client A is assigned id 12345, if the call was sent in the
opposite direction, in this case client B, the assigned id would still not be 12345, even for the
same call session [22]. When analyzing the tag field, we maintain the assumption that the tag
field will always be 8 characters long and have a possibility of 16 characters because of the
observed use of only hex based letters and digital numbers within the 3CX test bed system.
Therefore, the entropy for the tag field would be given by the equation: log2168 = 32.

7.4 Call-ID
The Call-ID field is randomly generated for each call and links messages together. As can be
seen in the results section of this thesis, it is unable to carry a covert channel because of its
specification that it must be the same for every request and response sent by a specific user
agent. Even though it must be the same for every call, it also must be randomly selected as to
not be chosen by two agents at any given time. Therefore, when we discuss the entropy of the
Call-ID field, we can safely say that the entropy is 1 due to no detectable pattern to apply and
predict what a given call should have as a Call-ID. Screen shots can be seen below as to the
difference in Call-ID’s within legitimate calls [22]. Theoretically, if the protocol was changed to
allow for manually selected Call-ID’s to be assigned, the entropy would be given by the
equation: log26259=351.2976.

7.5 CSeq
CSeq, or the call sequence, is the way that SIP keeps calls and packets in order as they arrive at
the server. For each new call made within the VoIP network, the CSeq field is incremented and
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sent within the SIP, along with the method for which the packet is being used. The most
common method is “INVITE” mainly because the SIP packet is acting as an invite for another
user agent to join the call. According to the Request for Comments which addresses SIP, nonregistered requests that enter the network to reach a specified client are assigned random CSeq
numbers, rather than the sequential ones used for registered calls, and are in the format of a
number less than 231. From this information we can determine that the entropy of the CSeq
field can be calculated as log2231-1 = 30.9999 [22].

7.6 Contact
The contact field is populated based on what ID is given to the phone by the system
administrator and thus passed down to the phone on its registration with the SIP server. In the
experiment, the two softphones were set as Softphone2 and Softphone1, as sender and
receiver respectively, and thus the entropy could be discovered by comparing the received
identification name of the sender, to that which was assigned to it from the server by the
systems administrator. With this characteristic being true, we can conclude that the entropy of
the Contact field would be 1. On the other hand, if there was no way to tell if the Contact
variable as assigned by the sending party was the same as the one which was received by the
receiving party, there is a bit more complication added into the entropy calculation. According
to RFC 3261, the contact can be up to 15 characters and be any combination of standard
alphanumeric characters as discussed in the branch statement. In addition to an identifier,
there is also an IP address appended to the field within angle brackets, and a port number from
which the call was sent from. Therefore, calculation of the contact field would consist of
log26215+ log234+ log2108+ log271+ log2104 = 138.3233.
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7.7 SDP V
As with the Max-Forwards field, in which there was a default value set to 70 which was unable
to be easily changed, the SDP V field has a default value of 0, due to its property of being the
version of a given announcement sent to the client. Usually, there is only a single
announcement sent to the client because the description of the call or data type contained
within it voice is unlikely to change, but there is the possibility of the description or data
changing. Therefore, even though the field is not readily apparent to the sender or receiver
when they are sending or receiving the call, respectively, upon further inspection, it can easily
be discovered as to whether a covert message may be hiding in the field by comparing the V
field’s value to the standard one of 0, especially if the description has not been changed by the
user. Based on this evidence, the calculation of entropy would be log2101 = 3.3219 [8].

7.8 SDP O
The SDP O field is used to identify the originator of the session to which the clients are not
taking part in. The O field is made up of the username of the originator, session ID of the call
and version, as well as the address of the originator’s host. In the experimentation phase of
this project, it was found that changing the session ID and call version of the O variable had no
effect on the call and still allowed for a call to be completed successfully. Similar to the contact
field, we must calculate the entropy of the IP address as well as the two identifier variables and
thus are left with the equation: log271 + log2104 + log271 + log2104 + log234 + log2108 = 65.1054.
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8. Covert Channel Detection Tool
Throughout the experiment, it was found that no tools actually existed for detecting covert
channels within voice over IP streams. Unless a systems administrator or network
administrator poured over logs regarding the VoIP transactions that took place and
meticulously dissected every SIP and SDP packet within those logs, there is little to no ability for
the detection of covert channels within Voice over IP. This downfall was furthered by the fact
that if a VoIP call was intercepted midway into the call, the packets would not be seen as RTP or
even SIP/SDP, but rather be seen as UDP packets because of the ability to identify them with
the average packet scanning tool. This is a problem which obviously needed to be fixed, based
on the shown ability for attackers with malicious intent to embed messages very simply, using
commercial off the shelf software (COTS), or just as easily be able to modify their own software
to modify packets as needed. Within the following paragraphs, an open source, java based,
covert channel identifying program will be discussed, based on the work of Keita Fujii [7] and
then modified by Patrick Lloyd with the help of Sean Madden.
The program works by analyzing captured packets, similar to most other packet capture
programs such as Wireshark. While capturing the packets, the program also analyzes them
with built in functionality from the original author, to discover the type of packet and break
down the packet into its basic characteristics, including whether the packet is IPv4 or IPv6, UDP
or TCP, the protocol through which the packet was sent, such as Ethernet, and basic
information about the packet including the captured time and the captured length. More
technical details regarding the program follow.
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Built in functionality included the ability for the program, JPCapDumper by Keita Fujii [7], to
capture programs using the JPcap library which was developed for exactly this purpose. The
program then displays the frames in a table type format, and if the packet is analyzable based
on given characteristics of supported packet formats, it displays these characteristics in the left
hand pane in a tree type format. Included formats for packets include: Ethernet packets, IPv4
Packets, IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet, SSH, SMTP, POP3, and ARP. There is also a
properties file which the program reads from to determine how to populate the columns on the
top of the windows, based on child properties of each of the aforementioned protocols.
With this framework, the UDP packet analyzer was used as a template to modify its abilities to
analyze VoIP packets because of their distinct similarities, and further add in functionality to
analyze whether a covert channel is present. This analysis of a VoIP packet containing a covert
channel is based on whether the packet contains the keyword “INVITE,” a keyword common to
all VoIP SIP and SDP packets, because of the list of features that is contained within the packet
(see line 00000150 of Figure 9). Based on this proving true, another operation is then triggered
to look for a regular expression which will detect and compare the variables: “Max-Forwards:”
to be followed by 70, “V=” followed by 0, “T=” followed by “0 0”, and “O=” followed by “-“.
These variables were the most easily changed and most common throughout multiple SIP
formats, without affecting the quality and format of the call and packet. If any of these
variables do not match their default values, a “found” variable will be changed to a “true”
boolean value and populate the characteristic of the VoIP child property Covert Channel, to be
“Yes,” thus indicating a possible covert channel within the packet.
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Figure 19: A covert channel detection tool with Packet Number, Source IP, Destination IP and
Covert Channel indication
If the keywords are not found, in other words if Max-Forwards is equal to 70, V is equal to 0, t is
equal to 0 0, and o is equal to –, or the variables just are not found in the packet, indicating a
non-SIP or non-SDP packet, the message of the covert channels column will be populated by a
“No” or “Not Available,”thus signaling the administrator to pass over it. The “Not Available”
variable will be specific to a non-UDP formatter packet. With the already built in ability to sort
the column by values, a systems or network administrator would be able to look over the
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record quickly and easily to determine whether a covert message may be present within the
current VoIP packet.
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Figure 20: Flowchart depicting the operation of covert channels detection program
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9. 3rd Party Developed Tools
Within this thesis, a number of tools were discussed which allow a user to embed a covert
message into a SIP or SDP packet and an administrator to detect these messages to protect the
integrity and security of their network. Other projects done by colleagues at Rochester
Institute of Technology have focused on a similar task but rather than SIP and SDP, there is a
focus on the ability to embed covert messages within the timestamp that is included in RTP
packets while data is being sent between two clients. Author Christopher Forbes [5], discusses
the ability to change the timestamp of a given RTP packet to use a similar method as seen here:
using two digits to send an ASCII code to the other user and not impair the quality of a VoIP call.
Unlike SIP and SDP covert messages, RTP covert messages can be much more numerous
because of the need for encoding that is used to send data to the receiving party. This allows a
much longer message to be sent to the receiving party while still using relatively simple
methods to send them, mainly by using a C language based program.

10.

Future Work

Future work includes more investigation being done on detecting steganography in images and
other formats which allow for messages to be sent by being “in plain sight.” By developing a
larger understanding of the inner workings of steganography and how it can be impacted by
forensic investigation, there is the ability to better understand and prevent covert messages in
telecommunication protocols.
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11.

Conclusion

This thesis has shown the ability to embed covert messages into a Voice over IP stream, merely
by modifying the SIP and SDP packets which are sent at the beginning of the call. While these
messages must be small in nature and must be embedded into the call by using a packet
modification tool, they present a clear and present danger to networks and companies which
can be easily combated against by monitoring the packets that flow through a communications
network. To aid in the ability to monitor the network, a tool has been provided which allows
for the capture of packets flowing through the communications network which also allows for a
network administrator to sort the resulting packets to easily find an indicator of a covert
channel message. This indicator comes in the format of a simple Yes/No/Not Available option
within the program.

12.
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